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ANNUAL SURVEY OF OKLAHOMA CONTRACT,
CONSUMER, AND COMMERCIAL LAW: 2000-2002
FRED H. MILLER*

Introduction
This first annual survey of contract, consumer, and commercial law in
Oklahoma spans a somewhat greater period than a year to provide an adequate
scope to discuss current developments.
Oklahoma contract law, unfortunately, is codified extensively in a series of
statutes - located in title 15 of the Oklahoma Statutes' - that, at times, is
more reminiscent of the past than of the modem law of contracts, such as
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and other sources. For
example, Oklahoma's statutory definition of what constitutes a contract 2 has
not changed since 1910. This means that a large part of the law is reflected
in cases interpreting or applying a particular statute, which (1) seriously
detracts from the purpose of codification in the first place; and (2) makes
decisions from other jurisdictions, particularly those that develop the law, of
less use than they may be in jurisdictions without extensive codification.
In contrast, Oklahoma consumer law - which can be viewed as specialized
contract law governing particular aspects of certain types of transactions
involving individuals who enter into transactions for personal, family, or
household purposes - is reflected primarily in the Oklahoma Uniform
Consumer Credit Code3 and the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act.4 These
statutes are of more modem vintage and have been kept more up-to-date.5
© 2003 Fred H. Miller
* Kenneth McAfee Chair in Law and Centennial Professor, George Lynn Cross Research
Professor, University of Oklahoma. My two research assistants, Jeb Boatman, 3L, and John
Lackey, IL, assisted in the preparation of this article.
1. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-1024 (2001).
2. Id.
3. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 1-101 (2001).
4. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 751-763 (2001 & Supp. 2002). Other statutes, however, may
qualify as consumer law. See, e.g., 24 OKLA. STAT. §§ 131-148 (2001 & Supp. 2002); 59
OKLA. STAT. §§ 1950-1957, 2081-2093 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
5. For example, when the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1665b, and the
federal Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667-1667e, were passed, and regulations under them
promulgated at 12 C.F.R. parts 226 and 213, the legislature amended Oklahoma law to keep
Oklahoma's creditors and lessors exempt from the need to comply with those laws as permitted by
15 U.S.C. §§ 1633, 1667e and 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.29 and 213.9. The legislature must update
Oklahoma law as changes in federal law occur in order to preserve the exempt status.
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They are, however, far from uniform with consumer law in otherjurisdictions.
Finally, Oklahoma commercial law - which likewise is a form of special
contract law governing particular aspects of what are considered "commercial
transactions"- comprises the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).6 Oklahoma
commercial law is both up-to-date7 and uniform for the most part with the
UCC as enacted in other jurisdictions. This means that decisions from other
jurisdictions interpreting the UCC have significant precedential value when
applied to Oklahoma commercial law. 8 Accordingly, some decisions of
significance from other jurisdictions are discussed.
ContractLaw
The consequences of the "ancient" codification of general Oklahoma
contract law in title 15 of the Oklahoma Statutes is illustrated by litigation
regarding the parol evidence rule. Section 155 of title 15 states: "When a
contract is reduced to writing,9 the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from the writing alone, if possible, subject, however, to the other provisions
of this article."'" Oklahoma cases - including the recent case of Duncan Oil
Properties, Inc. v. Vastar Resources, Inc." - generally adhere to the
statutes." This may, but does not necessarily, result in a somewhat different
6. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-101 (2001).
7. The latest update is revised Article 9, enacted in 2000 and effective July 1, 2001. 12A
OKLA.STAT. §§ 1-9-101 to -710 (2001).
8. See Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 1985 OK 32, 115,699 P.2d
146,149 (interpreting 12A OKLA. STAT. §l-102(2)(c) (1981)); see also infra note 89.
9. The Oklahoma Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 15-101 to
-121 (2001), changes the writing requirement to one of a "record." "Record" means
"information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." 12A OKLA. STAT. § 15-102(16) (2001). The
purpose of the UETA is to broadly override outdated signature and writing requirements in
general statutes so as to permit or facilitate transactions in electronic form. Whether the
comparable federal law, the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-06, 7021, 7031 (West Supp. 2003) ("E-Sign Act"), applies due to the
exemption from the federal act at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002(a) (West Supp. 2003), is beyond the
scope of this article, but on this point there is no difference.
10. See also 15 OKLA. STAT. § 154 (2001) (language of contract to govern if clear and
explicit); id. § 156 (exception for fraud, mistake, or accident); cases cited infra note 12.
11. 2000 OK CIV APP 146,16 P.3d 465.
12. See, e.g., Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. Mesa Operating Co., 3 Fed. App. 951, 958 (10th
Cir. 2001) (application of parol evidence rule); Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. Burlington N. R.R.
Co., 53 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 1995) (where there is no ambiguity, intent must be
determined from words used); Duncan, 1 6, 16 P.3d at 467 ("If the terms of a contract are
unambiguous, clear and consistent, they are accepted in their plain and ordinary sense."); Jerry
Chambers Exploration v. Headington Penn Corp., 1994 OK CIV APP 46, 1 9, 878 P.2d 385,
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body of law than that governing contracts for the sale or lease of goods
governed by the more liberally intended parol evidence rule in more modem
statutes.' 3 However, the potential exists - even though it is not inevitable for divergence because of the age of the Oklahoma codification. To illustrate
further, the decisions on choice of law by agreement are much the same. 4
However, in Oklahoma, in the absence of a time specification for performance
in a contract a reasonable time is allowed, whether the contract involves a
sale of goods or other type of contract.' 5 Moreover, the "special" contract law
in the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code'6 is incomplete, and thus
generally is supplemented by the contract law codified in title 15. '
On the whole, because the Oklahoma contract statutes, including the UCC,
can be viewed for the most part as "default" rules - meaning that normally
the parties can specify, subject to overriding limitations,' 8 the rule to govern
the matter 9 - little potential exists for inconsistency in Oklahoma law; the
statutes only supply the governing rule if the contract is silent or invalid as to
the point at issue. Accordingly, few decisions involving general Oklahoma
contract law are issued each year. Furthermore, the decisions that courts
render tend to deal with issues to which the contract statutes speak only
389 ("[W]hile parol testimony cannot vary, modify, or contradict the terms of the instrument
it is admissible to explain the meaning of words when there is a latent ambiguity."). But see 15
OKLA. STAT. § 160 (2001) ("Words... are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense,
rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless used by the parties in a technical sense,
or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage .. "); id. § 161 ("Technical words are
to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they
relate .... "); id. § 163 ("A contract may be explained by reference to circumstances under
which it was made .... ).
13. 12A OKLA. STAT. § § 2-202, 2A-202 (2001). Section 2-202, comment 1 of the Uniform
Commercial Code states: "This section definitely rejects ... (b) The premise that the language
used has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in the law
rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in which it was used."
U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (2001). But see C.F. Braun & Co. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 603 F.2d
132, 133 (10th Cir. 1979) (contract not ambiguous and trial court properly refused extrinsic
evidence).
14. Collins Radio Co. of Dallas, Tex. v. Bell, 1980 OK CIV APP 57, 115,623 P.2d 1039,
1045 (UCC choice of law provision allows parties to agree on applicable law); Op. Okla. Att'y
Gen. No. 01-17, 2001 OK AG 17 (parties to contract may elect as to choice of law); cf. 12A
OKLA. STAT. § 1-105(1) (2001); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2001).
15. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 2-309(1) (2001); 15 OKLA. STAT. § 173 (2001).
16. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-101 (2001) (including primarily UCC Articles 2 and 2A).
17. Id. § 1-103.
18. See, e.g., Herren v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 OK CIV APP 82, 26 P.3d 120
(contract provision subject to state public policy, but no violation found).
19. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (2001) ("A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to
the mutual intention of the parties," consistent with legal principles).
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generally, and thus require supplemental guidance. Current decisions include
litigation about what contracts may violate the law;2" which contracts may
contravene public policy;2' the appropriate application of the consideration
requirement;" issues relating to arbitration provisions2" and other aspects of
contract enforcement;24 and other contract requirements.25
Consumer Law
Recent developments in Oklahoma consumer law26 cover a broad range of
issues. First, in order to retain the exemption for Oklahoma transactions from
the federal Truth in Lending and Consumer Leasing Acts,27 the Oklahoma
legislature has added a variety of amendments to the Oklahoma Uniform
Consumer Credit Code.2" Other amendments were made to the part that
adjusts statutory dollar amounts.29 Additional noteworthy amendments were
20. Id. 88 211-220; Cardiovascular Surgical Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 2002 OK 27,
61 P.3d 210 (provisions of non-competition agreement); Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v.
Matthews, 2000 OK CIV APP 109, 12 P.3d 977 (provisions of non-competition agreement);
Gabler v. Holder & Smith, Inc., 2000 OK CIV APP 107, 11 P.3d 1269 (provisions of noncompetition agreement); see 15 OKLA. STAT. § 219A (2001); Yale 41 Associates Ltd. P'ship
v. Five Shopping Ctr. Co., 16 Fed. Appx. 921 (10th Cir. 2001) (liquidated damage clause);
Broken Arrow P'ship v. PBC Inv. Opportunities, Inc., 2001 OK CIV APP 118, 33 P.3d 694
(solicitation of lewd acts); Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 02-009, 2002 OK AG 9 (legal requirement
for offer).
21. See, e.g., Herren, 2001 OKCIV APP 82,26 P.3d 120; Obrien v. Dorrough, 19960K
CIV APP 25, 928 P.2d 322.
22. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 2(4) (2001); Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Okla. State
Ins. Fund, 2002 OK CIV APP 7, 38 P.3d 248; Fox v. Bechthold, 2001 OK CIV APP 151, 37
P.3d 966; In re Estate of Lovekamp, 2001 OK CIV APP 71, 24 P.3d 894; W. Star Fin., Inc. v.
White, 2000 OK CIV APP 59, 7 P.3d 502.
23. City of Lawton v. Int'l Union of Police Ass'n, Local 24, 2002 OK 1, 41 P.3d 371;
Gitgood v. Howard Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 2002 OK CIV APP 98,57 P.3d 875; see also 15 OKLA.
STAT. §§ 801-818 (2001).
24. See, e.g., Bohm, Inc. v. Michael, 2002 OK CIV APP 60, 46 P.3d 1286 (prejudgment
interest rate).
25. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (2001); Nat'l Envtl. Serv. Co. v. Ronan Eng'g Co., 256 F.3d 995
(10th Cir. 2001) (mutual consent to form contract); Dixon v. Bhuiyan, 2000 OK 56, 10 P.3d
888 (same); Lane v. Floorcraft Clyde Beherens, Ltd., 2001 OK CIV APP 103, 29 P.3d 1092
(statute of frauds).
26. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 1-101 (2001); 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 751-763 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
27. See supra note 5.
28. For example, title 14A, sections 3-309.4 through 3-309.5 of the Oklahoma Statutes (and
related definitions in section 1-301) were added to track amendments to Truth in Lending
dealing with high rate/high fee mortgage loans and reverse mortgages. Another example is
amended section 3-109, which better defines what constitutes a loan finance charge and follows
a similar amendment in the federal law.
29. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 1-106 (Supp. 2002). The statute allows certain designated dollar
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passed that (1) make changes in the statute in light of experience, such as
authorizing new changes; 30 (2) clarify the law and overrule an unfortunate
Supreme Court decision that followed a poorly reasoned opinion of the
Attorney General; 3' and (3) update administrative procedure under the Act.32
Largely because administrative examination- used to detect errors early
on 33 - and enforcement34 have been so effective, there has been little
litigation in the consumer area.
As noted, developments also occurred with respect to other Oklahoma laws,
including the other major Oklahoma consumer protection law, the Oklahoma
Consumer Protection Act.36 First, the legislature recently amended the
37
Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act to add the Telemarketer Restriction Act,
which creates a registry for consumers desiring not to be bothered by
unsolicited telemarketing calls.3 ' Two other recent amendments include a
restriction on the type of information that businesses can place on credit card
receipts 39 and a provision making fraudulent e-mail messages unlawful.4"
Also, the violation of a number of other consumer protection laws now
constitutes a violation of the Consumer Protection Act.4 '
amounts for charges to keep up with inflation by administrative regulation. See also OKLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 160:20-1-19, app. C (2002) (rule announcing changes in dollar amounts).
30. See, e.g., 14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 2-202.1, 2-203, 3-202, 3-202.1, 3-203, 3-203.2 (2001
& Supp. 2002).
31. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 198 (1997); see 14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-205, -206, -508B (2001);
Indep. Fin. Inst. v. Clark, 1990 OK 43, 990 P.2d 845.
32. 14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-502 to -506 (2001).
33. Id. §§ 3-506, 6-106.
34. Id. §§ 3-505, 6-105, 6-108 to 6-113. There also has also been considerable activity
under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 751-763 (2001 & Supp.
2002), and by the Oklahoma Attorney General in the area of consumer protection.
35. But see Hardison v. Balboa Ins. Co., 4 Fed. Appx. 663 (10th Cir. 2001). This lack of
litigation is notwithstanding provisions for private enforcement by consumers that have
produced considerable litigation under the federal statutes. See, e.g., 14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 5203, -204 (2001) (also amended to track changes in the federal law); id. § 5-206 (also added to
track changes in the federal law).
36. See supra note 4.
37. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 775B.1-.7 (Supp. 2002).
38. Id. § 775B.3. The Consumer Protection Act also includes an act regulating commercial
telephone solicitations, requiring registration, and specifying unlawful practices. 15 OKLA.
STAT. § 775A.1-.5 (2001 & Supp. 2002). See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 02-38, 2002 OK AG 38
(Telemarketer Act extends to wireless telephones and "text messages"). But see Brice v. AT&T
Communications, Inc., 2001 OK CIV APP 112,32 P.3d 885 (telecommunication carrier exempt
from Consumer Protection Act).
39. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 752A (Supp. 2002).
40. Id. § 776.1 (2001).
41. For example, a violation of the Oklahoma Health Spa Act, 59 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2000-
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Various decisions have interpreted the Act, including Conatzerv. American
Mercury Insurance Co.," in which the court held that title laundering,
designed to avoid salvage title requirements for a vehicle, constitutes a
deceptive trade practice;43 Patterson v. Beall," holding that a demand for
payment for an appraisal that was neither requested nor performed could be
a deceptive trade practice, unless there was no capacity to deceive; 45 and Walls
v. American Tobacco Co.,' determining who can recover or bring an action
as an "aggrieved consumer" or on another basis.47
Finally, in 2002 the Oklahoma legislature amended the Oklahoma Credit
Services Organization Act 8 to provide that any extension of credit brokered
or arranged by a credit services organization, on behalf of a buyer of the
services of the credit services organization, must comply with the Oklahoma
Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the Credit Services Organization Act.49
With this amendment the legislature attempted to regulate local, small-loan
lenders through whom small, high-rate loans are given by out-of-state federal
financial institutions not subject to state law.50
CommercialLaw
The most recent amendment to Oklahoma commercial law in the Uniform
Commercial Code5 is the enactment in 2000 of revised Article 9, dealing with
secured transactions. One important aspect of the change is the incorporation
in the "commercial statute" of a number of consumer-orientated provisions including an affirmative repudiation of the so-called "waiver of defenses"
clauses in consumer chattel paper, such as a lease of goods or a retail
2009 (2001). See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 753(16) (2001 & Supp. 2002).
42. 2000 OK CIV APP 141, 15 P.3d 1252.
43. Id. 16, 15 P.3d at 1256 (interpreting 15 OKLA. STAT. § 752(11) (Supp. 1999)).
44. 2000 OK 92, 19 P.3d 839.
45. Id. 1 35, 19 P.3d at 847.
46. 2000 OK 66, 11 P.3d 626.
47. Id. 1 16, 11 P.3d at 630; see also Dean Baily Olds, Inc. v. Richard Preston Motor Co.,
2000 OK 89, 32 P.3d 816 (defendant car seller could recover attorney's fees); Tibbetts v. Sight
'N Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 2000 OK CIV APP 47,6 P.3d 1064 (consumers could recover
costs and attorneys fees as prevailing party even if no actual damages).
48. 24 OKLA. STAT. §§ 131-148 (2001 & Supp. 2002).. A prior amendment had excluded
residential mortgage brokers (previously included, see Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 87-126, 1987
OK AG 126), because of the passage of the Mortgage Broker Licensure Act, 59 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 2081-2093 (2001& Supp. 2002). See 24 OKLA. STAT. § 132(2)(b)(9) (2001 & Supp. 2002).
49. 24 OKLA. STAT. § 141 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
50. See, e.g., 14A OKLA. STAT. § 3-508B (2001); see Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
51. 12AOKLA. STAT. § 1-101 (2001).
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installment sales contract. Revised Article 9 incorporates the Federal Trade
Commission "notice," allowing the obligor to assert claims and defenses even
if the chattel paper does not actually contain the notice. Thus, both state law
and the FTC rule5 2 are violated by the omission. 3
Revised Article 9 also "fudges" on other important consumer issues,
perhaps allowing consumers to litigate issues to establish a rule otherwise
repudiated for commercial transactions. For example, although Article 9
adopts the so-called "dual status" rule for changes in purchase money
transactions,54 the determination of the proper rule for a consumer-goods
transaction is left to the courts.55 Fortunately in Oklahoma, existing case law
under former Article 9 - which arguably also left the issue open - has
correctly rejected the so-called "transformation rule," which causes the loss
of purchase money status. 6 Consequently, Oklahoma courts are unlikely to
adopt the rejected rule for consumer goods transactions under revised
Article 9. Sanction for commercially unreasonable conduct by the secured

52. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (2002).
53. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-9-403(d) (2001); see also id. § 1-9-404(d). Uniform Commercial
Code Comment 5 states that this effectively renders a waiver of defense clause ineffective.
Under the FTC rule, a waiver in the contract is a violation of the rule, but if there is a violation
in not putting the FTC notice in, what is one more violation in putting in a waiver, particularly
if it follows Oklahoma law, discussed infra this note. However, a waiver may well mislead the
consumer, and thus it may be legally ineffective (but see infra this note) but have an effect
practically. Doing so should not only violate the FTC rule, but violate title 15, sections 751
through 764.1 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. 15 OKLA.
STAT. § 751-764.1 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
Note that the next subsection, title 12A, section 1-9-403(e), provides that it is subject to
other law, which establishes a different rule for a consumer. See, for example, section 1-9201(b), and particularly subsection (c) of section 1-9-201. The problem is title 14A, section 2404 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which provides a less protective rule for consumers in a
consumer credit sale or lease. Arguably - and notwithstanding title 12A, sections 1-9-403(e)
and 1-9-201(b) and (c) - the intent is clear, and, therefore, the later enactments, sections 1-9403(d) and 1-9-404(d), should control, rather than the title 14A consumer rule, to which Article
9 must otherwise defer.
There are numerous other affirmative consumer provisions in revised Article 9, including
additional sanctions for violations of Article 9. See, e.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-9-109(d)(13)
(2001) (excluding from Article 9 assignments of consumer deposit accounts); id. § 1-9-625
(sanctions).
54. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-9-103(f) (2001). The law provides further important protections.
See, for example, a payment allocation rule in subsection (c), and a rule in § 1-9-103(b)(2) to
avoid the result in Southtrust Bank of Alabama v. Borg-WarnerAcceptance Corp., 760 F.2d
1240 (11th Cir. 1985), which discusses the loss of purchase money status.
55. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-9-103(h) (2001).
56. In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 280 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); see, e.g., In re Russell, 29 B.R.
270 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983).
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party provides another example. For commercial situations, Article 9 adopts
the so-called "rebuttable presumption" rule where a surplus or deficiency is
at issue. 7 In a consumer transaction, however, the issue is again left to the
courts.5 8

The Oklahoma Comments to various revised or amended Code Articles written by members of the Oklahoma Bar Association after the revisions or
amendments are enacted - discuss litigation under the prior law that either
remains valid or that the legislature has changed. Other than those lawsuits
brought under Articles 2 and 9, few cases have been litigated in Oklahoma
during the 2000-2002 period. Only a few cases prior to that period merit
mentioning, those decided under UCC Articles that have not yet been revised
or amended. One of those cases, W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. FirstNational Bank
& Trust Co. of Tulsa,59 serves as a reminder that the UCC is not the only law
that may apply to a commercial transaction; law not displaced by the Code
supplements the UCC.6 ° Another case, Goss v. Trinity Savings & Loan
Ass 'n,6" emphasizes the common-sense application of the UCC, recognizing
its policies, principles, and commercial practice background.62
An area of "older" law also worth mentioning relates to the duty of good
faith that exists in every contract and is imposed by the UCC with regard to
contract performance and enforcement.63 Most Oklahoma cases correctly treat
this duty as creating a standard against which to measure performance or
enforcement and do not normally find a cause of action, tortious in nature, for
breach of an independent duty of good faith and fair dealing.' One case,
however, did;65 it may be a hard case that makes bad law. Another area of
57. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-9-626(a) (2001). But see id. §§ 1-9-615, 1-9-625(a)-(d).
58. Id. § 1-9-626(b). Oklahoma, under the former Article 9, rejected the so-called "absolute
bar" rule, which, in essence, constitutes an impermissible penalty under section 1-106(1), and
thus, Oklahoma courts would no doubt reject that approach under section 1-9-626(b). However,
the prior Oklahoma law treating conduct by a secured party as conversion when the conduct is
not commercially reasonable, interferes with the debtor's rights in the collateral, and thus leads
to damages for loss of use or collateral value, still remains valid and could be utilized. See 12A
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1-9-625 Okla. cmts. (West 2001).
59. 1977 OK 28, 563 P.2d 117; see also Cent. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Cmty.
Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 1977 OK 141, 528 P.2d 710.
60. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103 (2001).
61. 1991 OK 19, 813 P.2d 492. A similar case is Sesow v. Swearingen, 1976 OK 97, 552
P.2d 705.
62. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-102(t)-(2) (2001).
63. Id. § 1-203.
64. See Roberts v. Wells Fargo AG Credit Corp., 990 F.2d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 1993);
Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commercial Bank, N.A., 1990 OK CIV APP 105, 1 14,806
P.2d 1140, 1142.
65. Beshara v. S. Nat'l Bank, 1996 OK 90,128, 928 P.2d 280, 288.
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older law worth mentioning concerns the scope of UCC Article 2, generally
designated as "transactions in goods."66 Of course, many contracts involve the
sale of goods and services or other property. Most courts in these cases apply
what is known as the "predominant purpose test," and rather sparse Oklahoma
authority would seem to agree.67
Another issue of scope is whether Article 2 applies to a software license
that, for example, is embodied in a CD-ROM disc. Some courts nationally
have applied Article 2 in this context, including the otherwise well-reasoned
case of ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg.6 s In a recent Oklahoma decision regarding
the issue, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, in
NMP Corp. v. Parametric Technology Corp.,69 applied the predominant
purpose test - perhaps not illogically in the absence of Oklahoma authority
and given some authority applying Article 2 directly or indirectly - and
found that the licensing agreement constituted a sale of goods.7" Nonetheless,
the court erred by missing two crucial points.
First, software, no matter what its medium of delivery, is the value in a
license; it is information and not a good, any more than engineering plans or other commercially valuable data - are goods merely because they exist
on paper. Furthermore, a license is not a sale, although it is a "transaction".
Second, applying the rules of Article 2 to information transactions is
inappropriate in many instances. The application can invoke the "first sale"
doctrine and substantially destroy the value of the intellectual property to its
creator. It can involve warranty liability conflicts with First Amendment
considerations in information. Furthermore, the application can result in a
nonsensical remedy structure.

66. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 2-102 (2001).
67. Dunn Buick, Inc. v. Belle Isle Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 9 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (CBC) 827 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971). The court does not discuss the issue but does
apply Article 2 without comment to a contract where the main value clearly was in the sale of
goods and not in the provision of services.
68. 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). The case is perhaps better known for its upholding
contracts with terms included after the product is purchased and delivered. Id. Again, there is
a difference of opinion about such terms. If the situation is, as it was in this case (the vendor
proposed a contract that the licensee could accept or reject, and the licensee chose not to reject),
or involves a situation where the licensee knows the vendor does not propose to contract until
later terms are accepted by failure to return or use, then the analysis in ProCD,Inc. is clearly
correct. Note that Old Albany Estates,Ltd. v. HighlandCarpet Mills, Inc., 1979 OK 144, 604
P.2d 849, is not inconsistent, as there the court held that a contract existed prior to delivery of
the product. Old Albany Estates, 115, 604 P.2d at 853. The subsequent acceptance of the
product did not constitute an acceptance of the terms. Id.
69. 958 F. Supp. 1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
70. Id. at 1542.
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It is submitted that a court facing this issue would be on sounder ground if
it applied the common law and fashioned the common law rule after the most
advanced thinking on the topic, found in the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act. 7'
Turning to more current decisions, the issue in Allen v. Lynn Hickey Dodge,
Inc.,72 was whether a car dealer or the driver owned an automobile when an
automobile accident occurred.73 Under title 12A, section 2-401(2) of the
Oklahoma Statutes, title to goods sold can pass by a term in the contract, or
pursuant to a statutory default rule in subsection (2). Unfortunately, as it often
does, the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the case on a procedural issue
rather than providing a decision of precedential value, even though the lower
courts had decided it on the facts. The case may have turned on the contract
itself, however, and so may have been of little value.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reached a much more important
decision in ChristensenAviation, Inc. v. State Bank, N.A. 74 The court held that
the statutory provision in UCC section 4-207(c) - permitting recovery of
expenses for breach of transfer and presentment warranties in the checkcollection process - does not authorize recovery of attorney fees.75 While
some courts disagree with this interpretation, the decision probably is correct
given the extensive explicit legislation in Oklahoma specifying when recovery
of attorney's fees is authorized 76 and given that the issue does not require
uniformity.
In re Shirel77 constitutes another significant decision in the area. In the
case, Chapter 7 debtors claimed, without objection, that their refrigerator was
exempt under Oklahoma law and therefore moved to avoid a secured party's
security interest in the refrigerator. In its response, the creditor objected to the
claim of exemption and opposed the debtor's motion. The Bankruptcy Court
held that Oklahoma law applied to the parties' transaction, despite the parties'
contractual choice of Georgia law because Georgia had no relation to the
transaction,7 8 the phrase "all merchandise" did not sufficiently describe the
71. See, e.g., Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1330-31
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (UCITA provides guidance on the proper common law rule; and makes clear
that the bona fide purchaser rule of the UCC should not apply to the licensing of intellectual
property); see also Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (although it did not govern,
the court found UCITA's provisions offered insight).
72. 2001 OK 93, 39 P.3d 781.
73. Id. 1 1, 39 P.3d at 783.
74. 2001 OK CIV APP 19, 20 P.3d 170.
75. Id. 9, 20 P.3d at 172.
76. E.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 936-939 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
77. 251 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2000).
78. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-105(1) (2001).
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collateral and, thus, the debtor's credit card application did not create a
security interest in the refrigerator under the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial
Code. The court's analysis on this last point is flawed and may be overruled
by title 12A, sections 1-9-108 and 1-9-504 of the Oklahoma Statutes. It is
noteworthy that the court described adhesion contracts as standardized
contracts prepared entirely by one party that, because of the disparity in
bargaining power, must be accepted on a "take it or leave it basis" and
cautioned that they should therefore be carefully scrutinized.
In another recent decision, Alexander v. Smith and Nephew, P.L.C., 9 a
patient brought a products liability suit against the manufacturer of a spinal
rod system that was implanted into her back. As to the defendants' motions
for summary judgment and to exclude or limit the testimony of plaintiff's
medical causation expert, the District Court held that the manufacturer could
not be held liable under Oklahoma products liability or negligence law absent
expert testimony establishing medical causation. The court also held that
Oklahoma warranty law does not find the manufacturer of a device to be
found in breach of warranty without evidence that the device caused the
80
injury.
Another UCC Article 2 case is Sutton v. Snider.8 In Sutton, a motorcycle
owner, who had allowed a dealer to display the motorcycle for sale, sued the
purchaser of the motorcycle from the dealer to replevin the motorcycle. The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the purchaser. The
owner appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals cited title 12A,
section 2-403 of the Oklahoma Statutes and held that the motorcycle purchaser
"[was] an innocent purchaser for value and ... the rightful owner of the
motorcycle" 2 because he had no notice of dealings or agreements between the
dealer and the former owner. The court also held that where one party must
suffer loss because of a third party's actions, the party who makes the action
possible should bear the loss. 83
A final Article 2 case is Elmore v. Doenges Bros. FordInc.,84 in which a
car buyer brought an action against the dealership alleging breach of warranty
of title. The jury awarded the buyer $25,000.85 The Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals held that (1) sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict because
the defendant's breach of the warranty of title left the plaintiff - who held a
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

98 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Okla. 2000).
Id. at 1318-19.
2001 OK CIV APP 117, 33 P.3d 309.
Id. 1 10, 33 P.3d at 313.
Id. 1 10, 33 P.3d at 312-13.
2001 OK CIV APP 27, 21 P.3d 65.
Id. 4, 21 P.3d at 68-69.
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defective title - unable to sell the car; and (2) the award of $25,000 damages
was not excessive because the evidence indicated that the value of the car with
the defective title was only $100 to $200.86
Finally, a noteworthy Article 9 case is North Texas ProductionCreditAss 'n
v. McCurtain County National Bank.8 7 In the case, a credit association sued
a bank and the bank's officers, asserting that it held a superior lien on the
debtors' livestock and the proceeds received by the bank from the sale. Thus,
the association sought to avoid the bank's'lien on the livestock. The
Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that the association failed to adequately
prove that it had a purchase-money security interest in the cattle sold by the
debtors to establish its priority interest in the proceeds of sale under Oklahoma
law.88 The court further held that the secured creditor did not assume a first
priority position as to collateral simply because a previously filed financing
statement of another creditor was missing from the public record. The court
reasoned that a secured party does not bear the risk of another's improper
filing or indexing.
Because decisions under the UCC from any jurisdiction provide precedent
given the uniformity in this area of the law, 9 several significant decisions
from outside Oklahoma will be mentioned to conclude this survey.
Much UCC litigation arises in bankruptcy; indeed, the trustee in bankruptcy
often is the Article 9 secured creditor's biggest threat.' More than one
court - the most recent of which is the Eleventh Circuit in In re Kalter9 1 has held that a repossessed vehicle is not property in the debtor's bankruptcy
estate; rather, after repossession, title passes to the secured party leaving only
86. Id. 110, 21 P.3d at 69-70. The car with good title would have been worth $10,300
more. The court allowed, however, the difference ($14,700) as consequential damages due to
loss of employment that resulted from the loss of transportation. Id. 1 13, 21 P.3d at 70. Yet,
there was no evidence this loss (1) could have been foreseen; or (2) could not have been
mitigated. See 12A OKLA. STAT. § 2-715 (2001). Thus, the court's extremely tenuous analysis
voided the dealer's contract exclusion. See id.§ 2-719.
87. 222 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 809-10.
89. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-102(1)-(2) (2001); see also Nat'l Envtl. Serv. Co. v. Ronan Eng'g
Co., 256 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Because the UCC is intended to be applied
uniformly across the various states, courts routinely turn to decisions from other states when
there is no case law on point within the relevant jurisdiction."); see supra note 8.
90. A security interest valid under Oklahoma law may be invalidated in bankruptcy in
various ways. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 522(f) (2000). When revised Article 9 was enacted
in Oklahoma, title 47, section 1110 of the Oklahoma Statutes was amended to allow a twentyfive-day "grace period" to perfect a security interest in a titled vehicle. While that may be valid
against a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 544, unfortunately it is five days longer than the protection
from a preference attack by the trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 547.
91. 292 F.3d 1350 (1 th Cir. 2002); see also In re Lewis, 137 F.3d 1280 (1 th Cir. 1998).
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a right to redeem in the trustee.92 While the analysis and facts in Kalter
initially appear persuasive, it is doubtful whether state law controls or even
was correctly interpreted.93 The risk is violation of the automatic stay,94 and
as the opinion in Eskanos & Adler v. Leetien95 demonstrates, such a violation
can be very serious.96 In Leetien, a creditor filed a state-court action to collect
the debt after bankruptcy and failed to promptly dismiss the action, despite
information and requests from the debtor's counsel. The bankruptcy judge
found that the creditor committed a willful violation and imposed a sanction.
Another bankruptcy case, In re Cohen,97 involved a loan for a mobile home
guaranteed by the debtor's wife. The debtor sold the mobile home and spent
the proceeds. The debtor then delivered a cashier's check - as to which he
was at best only a remitter who could not enforce it - to the lender in
settlement. The check had been purchased with the wife's funds at a time
when she was insolvent. She later filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee
brought an action against the lender for the amount of the check, claiming the
check was a fraudulent conveyance.9" The issue turned on Bankruptcy Code
section 550, 9 9 and the court granted recovery. The court held the lender to be
an initial transferee, and that the transfer of the wife's funds had not been for
a reasonably equivalent value. One wonders if the result would differ if the
check had been payable to the debtor or his wife and then indorsed over to the
lender so the lender may not have qualified as "an initial transferee."
Cases from otherjurisdictions representing three other legal areas conclude
this survey. First, numerous cases protect a secured party in possession of
stock collateral from liability if the value of the securities declines so as to

92. Kalter, 292 F.3d at 1356.
93. Cf.In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1983) (so long as debtor has a right to redeem,
it remains property of the estate). Contrast title 12A, section 1-9-617 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
which provides that disposition transfers debtor's rights in collateral, which does not then permit
redemption from the security interest.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
95. 309 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
96. Id. at 1214 ("A party violating the automatic stay, through continuing a collection
action in a non-bankruptcy forum, must automatically dismiss or stay such proceeding or risk
possible sanction for willful violations.")
97. 300 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2002).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
99. Title 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) states that, to the extent a transfer is avoided under § 548, "the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or ...the value of
such property" from (1) the initial transferee; (2) the entity for whose benefit the transfer was
made; or (3) any immediate or mediate transferee of the initial transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)
(2000). The trustee may not recover from a transferee for value or from any immediate or
mediate good faith transferee of such transferee. Id. § 550(b).
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result in a deficiency before the disposal of the collateral."° This analysis is
sound, unless the debtor adequately protects the lender, if the debtor's
judgment proves erroneous. However, in FDIC v. Caliendo,'' the court,
expressing "equitable" concerns, went the other way and found that section
9-207 102 requires a secured party to sell when the party sees the market value
of the stock collateral plummet. 0 3 A later case, Solfanelli v. CorestatesBank,
N.A.," reached the same result, but under that court's analysis, the failure to
sell breached the obligation of good faith and rendered the sale commercially
unreasonable.'°5 Both cases seem to place more responsibility on the lender
than they should - absent exculpation from the debtor against a later suit
second-guessing the lender.
A second unfortunate change in the law is evidenced by Any Kind Checks
Cashed, Inc. v. Talcott.'° In Talcott, the court held that a check-cashing
service that (1) cashed a check much larger than it normally cashed; (2) from
a small businessman that presumably would normally use a bank; and (3) was
informed by the customer that speed was important, was not a holder in due
course because these red flags did not comport with modem reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.0 7 Thus, a debate that was thought to be
settled more than 100 years ago re-emerges. The additional obligation to
observe reasonable standards of fair dealing should not be read in this context
either to impose a duty of inquiry or to establish a quasi-negligence standard,
but rather to codify the case law that finds bad faith if one deliberately closes
one's eyes to avoid gaining knowledge of a problem. The result is not an
objective standard, but a subjective one in that the trier of fact can determine
was or was not met using an objective measure.'0 8
100. See, e.g., Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. of N.J. v. Prod. Metals Corp., 366 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Hutchison v. S. Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 274 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972).
101. 802 F. Supp. 575 (D.N.H. 1992).
102. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-9-207 (2001).
103. Caliendo, 802 F. Supp. at 580.
104. 203 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 200.
106. 48 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 800 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2002). A similar, perhaps
revolutionary, case is Maine Family FederalCredit Union v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 1999 ME
43, 727 A.2d 335, denying the credit union holder in due course status when it allowed
immediate credit on checks that turned out not to be good. Id. 23, 727 A.2d at 342.
107. 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-103(a)(4), 3-302(a)(2)(ii) (2001).
108. That is, if no one else would have acted as the claimed holder in due course did, the
trier of fact can question whether there was an honest belief that no problem existed or was
recognized. The analysis should perhaps be different only if there is an express statement in the
UCC that inquiry may be required. See, e.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1-9-331 official cmt. 5
(West 2001).
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Finally, recent changes in Article 3 abandoned, for the first time, the longstanding doctrine of placing fraud loss on the party who had the last chance
to prevent it, in favor of a comparable negligence standard, where fraud loss
is apportioned on the basis of degree of failure to exercise ordinary care.1 09
This approach satisfies cases that fall within the provisions that recognize it,
but several fact patterns, easily created by inventive crooks, do not. Thus,
because the changes simply suggest another way to accomplish a fraud,
pressure exists to allocate loss on a comparative fault basis in those instances
where the changes do not apply as well, by arguing that the UCC provisions
can be supplemented by other law." 0 An illustrative case is Southwest Bank
v. InformationSupport Concepts, Inc., ' in which a dishonest employee stole
checks payable to her employer and deposited them in her account without any
forged indorsement. The court, in the suit by the employer against the bank
for conversion, refused to allow the bank to assert a statute outside the UCC
on proportionate responsibility. The statute, if applied, would have allocated
some of the loss to the employer for failing to adequately supervise the
employee. If the employee had forged the indorsements, the UCC would have
allowed a comparative negligence analysis. 1 2 This dissimilarityof treatment
by the UCC of apparently similar situations became the subject of discussion
during the latest round of amendments to UCC Articles 3 and 4 promulgated
in 2002. However, the drafters included no amendments to address the matter
because of the lack of any consensus among interested parties as to whether
the issue merited that much attention. 3 Accordingly, the courts seem correct
109. 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-404, 3-405, 3-406, 4-406 (2001). The thought was that the
change would promote settlement and therefore reduce litigation, because one would seldom
obtain a "clean" win.
110. Id. § 1-103. The issue then becomes whether the UCC displaces the other law. A
similar effort can also arise when a winning case within the UCC provisions would be precluded
by the other law, and so the party attempts an "end run" using that law. Compare Heche v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 45 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 549 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) (allowing
a common law conversion claim even though a claim under the UCC was precluded for forged
checks) with White Sands Forest Prods., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Alamogordo, 50 P.3d 202,
206 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (UCC preempts all common law claims to resolve forged check
cases).
111. 85 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App. 2002).
112. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-405 (2001). A similar case is Cassello v. Allegiant Bank, 288
F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 2002). Two variants of the theme include situations where the bank itself is
made payee and the dishonest employee directs the funds to his or her own account, or where
UCC section 3-307 may be applicable.
113. Persons who perhaps are more thoughtful disagree. See, e.g., CLARK'SBANKDEPOSITS
& PAYMENTS MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 5-6. To the best of this author's recollection, as a
member of the drafting committee that worked on the revision of Article 3, the committee
simply failed to focus on this issue.
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in using supplementary law, as it completes a UCC policy." ,4 The narrow and
short-term view of the parties involved in the 2002 amendments on this issue
unfortunately is symptomatic of an all-too-common approach to law reform
today. That approach not only increases legal, and thus business, costs, but
ultimately may produce non-uniformity and then diminution of state law when
the matter becomes sufficiently acute.'"' This author has expressed an opinion
on this state of affairs elsewhere," 16 and will not repeat it here. Suffice it to
say, more than a failure of law reform is involved, because as state law
becomes outdated and irrelevant - or an impediment, so federal law will, and
must, fill the gap. Our federal system, Which has served us so well for over
200 years, thus is weakened.

114. 12AOKLA. STAT. §§ 1-102(1)-(2), 3-404to 3-406,4-406 (2001). A possible difficulty
may arise if the non-UCC state law is inconsistent with the UCC approach of "pure"
comparative fault (once a threshold level of "substantial contribution" is met). A court perhaps
simply could carry the analysis to its logical conclusion and interpret other state law to
accommodate the UCC approach. However, in the cases noted supra note 110, courts should
hold that the UCC displaces other law, as those cases are "end run" attempts.
115. For an excellent example of the narrow view, see the exchange of letters in the
September and October 2002 issues of the UCC Bulletin, volumes 47, Release 4 and 48 Release
1, at 1.
116. LYNNE B. BARR ETAL., Introductionto the 2003 Annual Survey of ConsumerFinancial
Services Law: Of Statutory Aging and Process Failure,58 Bus. LAW. 1131 (2003).
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